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particularly in credit allocation, is seen as the major problem in achieving stable
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CREATING STABLE MONETARY SYSTEMS IN 
POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES
1Jacek Rostowski
INTRODUCTION
Post-communist economies (PCEs) usually enter the transition to capitalism
with a high rate of inflation. This is, first, because price liberalisation without a hard
budget constraint or unemployment must lead to high inflation [Rostowski 1989].
Second, the weakening of communist political power in the period before the
overthrow of communist governments has often led to a weakening of such budgets
constraints as there were in the Soviet-type economy - particularly as regards wages.
Post-communist governments are thus often faced with the need to tackle high or
very high inflation just at the time when they also have to guide the country through
the transition to capitalism. Creating stable monetary systems in PCEs is thus vital
both in the short and the long term. Yet a major hindrance in the achievement of this
aim is the nature of banking systems in these countries. This paper aims to draw
lessons from banking reform in the more advanced countries (particularly Hungary
and Poland) for what one can call the "second wave" reformers (the countries of the
former Soviet Union and some of the Balkan states). In particular, we consider
whether the present generally accepted "main sequence" of banking reform is likely
to result in the creation of stable banking, and therefore monetary, systems. What we
call the "main sequence" consists in: (1) splitting up the traditional Soviet-type
monobank into a number of state-owned commercial banks (SCBs); (2) liberalizing
entry by private (mainly domestic) banks; (3) trying to privatize the SCBs.
There are two pre-conditions for a stable monetary system: a stable banking
system and an anchor binding the domestic currency to foreign currencies. Adopting
      Sometimes (e.g. in the USSR) they did not formally receive financial resources as1
such, but rather the right to extend credit according to their credit plan which was determined
for them by the state bank. Once the credit plan was received there was no need to actually
obtain financial resources. These were created by simply debiting the so-called "inter-branch
circulation" (the "mezhdufilialny oborot" in the USSR). In other words the specialised banks,
and indeed the branches of the state bank, created their own liabilities just like a central bank.
Control of this central bank money was exercised by control of credit creation by State Bank
headquarters via the credit plan. Once the Spetsbanki and the Republican Central Banks could
draw up their own credit plans (from 1989 and 1990 respectively) they effectively became
central banks, because they could still debit the "inter-branch circulation" to finance the credit
they extended. 
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a fixed exchange rate is insufficient in itself to achieve this, particularly in the absence
of central banking skills. Some kind of "monetary rule", providing an automatic link
between the money supply and reserve holdings of an outside asset is necessary
[Simons 1936].  A second question we consider is what kind of monetary rule is
suitable for PCEs at various levels of development of their banking systems. 
CREATING A STABLE BANKING SYSTEM
1. The "Main Sequence" of Banking Reform in PCEs
In Soviet-type economies the banking system consisted of a state monobank,
which combined the functions of a central bank and of the monopolistic commercial
bank. There were specialised banks for savings, foreign trade, sometimes investment
and some other functions such as agriculture, but these were parts of the monobank
in balance sheet terms, in that they had to hold 100% reserves against deposits, and
received financing for any lending from the central bank in the form of refinance
credit . 1
The main sequence of banking reform was initiated in Hungary in the mid-
1980s, and consists in a number of steps. The first is usually the hiving off the
commercial operations of the monobank into a number of state owned commercial
      In Poland the central bank still engaged in commercial operations, though on a much2
reduced scale, at the end of 1992.
      At the time of writing, none of the Hungarian SCBs has been privatized, in the3
Czech and Slovak Republics the SCBs have been partly privatized in the framework of the
mass privatization voucher program, and in Poland two SCBs are "soon to be" privatized.
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banks [SCBs]. In Hungary there were three of these, and in Poland, where the reform
took place in 1989, nine. These SCBs and the specialised banks were then required
to hold only a fraction of their deposits as reserves, while the state bank concentrated
on classical central bank functions . In this way the basic structure of a two tier2
banking system of the western kind was created. At the same time the creation of
private banks, both domestic and foreign, has been allowed. The next step in the
reform is supposed to be the privatization of the SCBs, once they have developed
sufficiently, both organizationally and in terms of their financial health, for this to be
feasible .3
An alternative path has been followed in Russia and Ukraine. There the
monobank first had three specialised banks split from it in 1989. Since these
"Spetsbanki" could create money and were thus effectively central banks, the State
Bank encouraged the creation of commercial and co-operative banks, the former
belonging to various state enterprises and organs (including Ministries!), the latter to
effectively private so-called co-operatives. This trend continued once the republican
central banks got their independence from USSR Gosbank, and was strengthened by
the creation of independent banks out of local sections of the "Spetsbanki" during
1991. The result was the creation of thousands of banks in the former Soviet Union
[FSU].
Transitional PCE banking systems initially tend to operate with very high
4ratios of reserves to deposits. This is partly the result of the fact that they start out
as monobank systems with 100% reserve backing of deposits, partly because of the
extreme inefficiency of the payments system, which requires the maintenance of large
commercial bank deposits at the central bank, and partly because of the great ease
of obtaining central bank credit by commercial banks in the pre-stabilization period.
Thus in the Soviet Union in June 1991 enterprise deposits were almost 60% backed
by reserves, whereas household deposits at the Savings Bank were 100% backed. In
Poland, just before the stabilization programme at the beginning of 1990, more than
three quarters of deposits were backed by reserves (mainly voluntary) at the central
bank. Yet a rapid reduction in central bank reserve backing of deposits is
characteristic of Post-communist banking systems once stabilization and market
oriented reform begin in earnest. Thus, a year after the beginning of the "big bang"
in Poland the ratio of reserves to liabilities had fallen to 30%, and after seventeen
months it stood at 20%. Thus Poland moved rapidly from a situation in which central
bank money was easily obtainable and backed a very high proportion of deposits to
one in which it became far less available, yet was substituted for by deposits at
commercial banks backed by credits.
2. The Inside Money Problem
In PCEs most banks are not capable of allocating credit on a commercial basis
among borrowers, as they do not have the skills to assess the creditworthiness of
clients, the likely profitability of a project requiring financing, or the riskiness of
either. The reason for this is that most banks are not only state owned, but until
recently were part of a monobank system, in which all deposits were effectively
      Unlike SCBs a central bank does not have limited liability, and cannot, even4
theoretically go bankrupt.
      And from less use of banks by a population concerned about the possibility of5
further bank failures, leading to a fall in the money multiplier and a "multiple contraction of
deposits effect". 
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liabilities of the central bank, and thus had their nominal value openly guaranteed
by the state. The monobank had two main functions:
a) a savings bank system which funnelled savings either to the state
budget or to state enterprises on the basis of central planners' decisions
via the monobank, making such loans quasi-budget expenditures;
b) a control system by which central planners could check up on, and
direct, the activities of state enterprises, with respect to both current
payments and financial resources for investment.
When a PCE switches from a monobank to a two tier banking system, it is
moving from a situation in which all money is "outside money" to one in which most
money is inside money, i.e. the liabilities of the banks instead of the state . We saw4
that upon stabilization there occurs a rapid increase in the ratio of inside to outside
money, i.e. the money multiplier increases sharply. This inside money is backed by
bank assets, mainly credit to the non-government sector. The problem is that this
backing for bank deposits may become highly uncertain as the true value of bank
assets (excepting reserves held at the central bank) may become significantly less than
the value of deposit liabilities, because of the low quality of credit allocation.
The rigorous application of market principles could then lead to the
bankruptcy of many banks, and a reduction in the money supply resulting from
depositors receiving only a fraction of their claims . The potentially disastrous effects5
      In the former Czecho-Slovakia the same was done by removing a large part of bad6
credits from the books of the SCBs and into a "Consolidation Bank".
      Poland now finds itself threatened with exactly this situation.7
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on the real economy of such a run on the banking system are well known [Friedman
and Schwartz, 1963]. On the other hand, bailing out the banks through government
recapitalization of their equity bases as is being done in Poland will create a severe
moral hazard problem, as the banks will be confirmed in their belief that they can
continue irresponsible and incompetent lending practices safely . The resulting regime6
could be intrinsically inflationary, as banks may offer excessively high interest rates
on their liabilities and grant credits without attention to the quality of the
borrower/project, believing that bad loans would be made good by the authorities.
Furthermore, unless the money for bank recapitalization was obtained through
taxation or government borrowing, successive bank recapitalizations could become
a roundabout way of printing money . The lack of banking skills in PCEs thus7
introduces a fundamental instability into their monetary systems. Until this problem
is resolved, macroeconomic stability will remain hard to attain.
3. Implications for "Main Sequence" Reform of the Banking System
In the long run the problems described above can be solved in one of two
ways. The first is the development of credit assessment, liability management, and
other banking skills in the banking systems of PCEs, and sophisticated bank
supervision skills in the bank supervisory authority - in other words through the
development of the skills necessary to provide the microeconomic underpinning of
a banking system along lines current in the West.
If this is the path followed then it would be prudent for the first principle of
7banking system evolution to be that in the short term the stability of the monetary
system must have priority over the freedom of action of the banks themselves in the
management of their assets and liabilities. In other words, in the initial phases of the
"main sequence", when supervisory and banking skills are rudimentary, bank
regulation needs to be rigorous and based on simple rules. This is because of the vital
role of macroeconomic stability in successful economic transition from state
ownership and central administration of the economy to capitalism.
The usual argument against tight regulation, which stresses that tight
regulation leads to disintermediation [Goodhart, 1989] is largely irrelevant in a
context in which people have so little possibility of informed choice between risky
and safe banks that the authorities feel themselves obliged to guarantee all deposits.
The development of a dual system in which deposits at strictly regulated banks are
known to be safe, while loans to unregulated non-bank financial institutions are
clearly known to be not guaranteed by government seems healthier than the
alternative by which all deposits are a contingent liability of a state budget which has
no effective control of the degree of risk to its exposure. In the West the state tries to
limit this exposure by sophisticated and light regulation of the whole of the banking
system, but in PCEs such regulation is likely to be ineffective for a long time because
of a lack of skills.
What methods of rigorous yet relatively simple regulation can central bank
authorities in PCEs apply? First, banks can be obliged to maintain some obligatory
reserve ratio. However, reserve ratios common in the Western world (in the 10-15%
range) would probably be insufficient, and ratios above 25% on current accounts
seem closer to what might be initially required to ensure a stable monetary system
8for a Post-Communist economy. High reserve ratios reduce the variability of the
money multiplier, and thus of the tendency of the money supply to vary in a pro-
cyclical way. They also reduce the share of bank assets held in the form of claims
against the non-bank sector, which is particularly important in PCEs, since it is these
very claims whose value is uncertain because of the shortage of credit assessment
skills in banks. If the PCE concerned also had some form of monetary rule (i.e. did
not have a lender of last resort), such obligatory reserves (unlike in the West) would
have to be available to the banks to meet the liquidity demands of their depositors.
Use of reserves by a bank would then trigger stricter supervision by the bank
supervisory authority. Second, banks can be obliged to hold high capital/asset ratios,
so that losses resulting from bad loans are borne by the owners of the bank's capital
and not by depositors or taxpayers (as happens if the bank is bailed out by the state).
Again, given low banking skills, capital/asset ratios of 25-30% would seem to be
prudent. Finally, banks need to be privatized, as only private owners of bank equity
will exercise the requisite degree of control over bank management, so as to secure
their equity. As banking and supervisory skills increased, and as the macroeconomic
situation stabilized, the stringency of regulation could be reduced by gradual
reductions in obligatory reserve and capital adequacy ratios, and the introduction of
more sophisticated forms of regulation (e.g. weighting exposure by risk, limiting
concentration of exposure, etc.). 
In the early stages of banking system evolution, the minimum desired ratio of
central bank to inside money in the economy can also be maintained through a policy
of tight credit limits on the banks. Whether credit limits or high obligatory reserve
and capital/asset requirements are chosen depends on the level of skills of central
9and commercial bank staff. Control of capital/asset ratios in particular requires an
ability to assess the degree to which loans need to be written down. 
A dilemma would arise in this case regarding the treatment of western banks.
High capital adequacy ratios reduce the rate of return on bank capital. When applied
to domestic banks with low skills they constitute a form of insurance for depositors
and for the government, which is the ultimate guarantor of deposits in the regulated
part of the system. If applied to reputable western banks with good banking skills
they would be a barrier to entry, and thus a drag on the development of an efficient
banking sector. Branches of foreign banks could remain in the unregulated,
unguaranteed, part of the system, as long as they were subject to the supervision of
their national bank supervisory authorities, and if the capital of the whole bank was
legally subject to make good the losses of its domestic branch. The foreign banks
might then take over the whole of the domestic market (having higher skills and
lower capital costs).
Thus PCEs are faced with four alternatives:
1) an inadequately regulated and excessively guaranteed banking system,
which will be microeconomically inefficient and macroeconomically
unstable;
2) a dual system, based on domestic banks, part of which is strictly
regulated and guaranteed, while the other is lightly regulated but
unguaranteed. The stringency of regulation in the strictly regulated
sector would decline as skills improved. Microeconomic efficiency
would initially be low, but would slowly improve, while
macroeconomic stability would be good;
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3) a lightly regulated system based mainly on foreign banks;
4) some mix of (2) and (3).
Which system out of options (2) to (4) a country will end up with would
depend on the desire of foreign banks to enter the market, and the rate at which the
banking skills of domestic banks developed, as well as the political willingness of the
authorities to allow foreign entry.
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4. The 100% Reserve Banking System
An alternative approach would be to start from the proposition that a banking
system which combines the functions of payments system and allocator of savings
may be fundamentally unstable whatever the level of banking skills, but that it is
certain to be so if such skills are lacking, and that such skills cannot be developed in
the time required, given that macroeconomic stabilization is essential for successful
economic transformation. Critics of bank based monetary systems often stress the
mismatch between the term structures of bank assets and liabilities, with liabilities
being extremely short term (i.e. money) and assets being far longer term. One
proposed solution, what one might call the traditional "sound banking" view, is that
banks should have more short term assets on their books. The problem is that such
assets can never be sufficiently short term to make their maturity correspond to that
of bank liabilities, and of course, being liabilities of the private sector, they are subject
to the risk of default. Furthermore, as Simons [1936] pointed out, an increase in the
amount of very short term liabilities of non-bank businesses to banks actually
increases the susceptibility of the economy to sharp fluctuations in the nominal
money stock, as banks can relatively easily refuse to roll over short term debt as it
comes due. In the absence of a central bank operating in a discretionary manner (i.e.
in the presence of a monetary rule) this susceptibility to money stock fluctuations
could become a reality, leading to profound economic depression.
Simons therefore suggested that both the asset and liability sides of banks'
balance sheets be reformed. Those financial institutions whose liabilities would
continue to be deposits (i.e. money) would be obliged to keep 100% of their assets in
the form of short term government (or central bank) liabilities. In other words, the
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payments system function of the banking system would be performed by what was,
from the balance sheet point of view, effectively a monobank system of the Soviet
type. If these reserves did not pay interest (the question is discussed below), then
users of the payments system would have to pay charges. This would prevent the
waste of the resources going into the performance of this function. On the other hand,
those institutions which no longer held deposit liabilities (i.e. non-bank financial
institutions) would be free of any reserve requirements, and only they would be able
to undertake the savings allocation functions of the banking system. Simons was very
dubious as to the feasibility proposals for eliminating the imbalance between the term
structures of bank assets and liabilities by allowing non-banks to take only long term
deposits and to make only long term loans (the problem is one of policing or
regulatory race). His solution was, therefore, to limit non-banks to granting and
taking equity participation (i.e. transforming them into investment trusts or Islamic
banks).
If we accept Simons' criticism of western banking systems, then maybe the
financial systems of PCEs should follow a quite different evolutionary route to that
pursued so far in their transformation. PCEs in the early stages of economic
transformation do not have banking systems, and they have a single integrated
payments system. This payments system is extremely inefficient and urgently needs
to be reformed. This could be done either by splitting up the existing monobank into
competing money warehousing and payments companies (WPCs) or by allowing
new, private, WPCs to be created. All WPCs would be obliged to keep all of their
assets either as reserves at the central bank, or at whatever clearing and settlement
centre(s) they wished to create (the clearing and settlement centre(s) would then keep
      However, to prevent barriers to entry refusal to allow access to a clearing system8
by its participants, as is happening in Poland, would need to be forbidden under anti-
monopoly legislation.
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its/their reserves at the central bank). The freedom of the WPCs to create their own
clearing and settlement centres is vital , as the inefficiency of the monobank in8
managing the payments system stems from its state owned nature, and the
achievement of payments and settlement times comparable with those in the West
is important for the overall economic efficiency of PCEs.
As they would be unable to lend out deposits WPCs would be obliged to
charge for their services, unless the state decided to subsidize the development of the
payments system by paying interest on WPCs reserves. This could be done by
allowing WPCs or clearing centres to hold their reserves in treasury bills or bonds.
One could argue in favour of this on the grounds of some "public good" aspect of the
payments system. WPCs would then compete for deposits, as these would generate
reserves which brought in interest. Those providing the best payments services would
get the most deposits, thus the most reserves and the most interest payments. It can
be argued that lender of last resort support to a two tier banking system by the
authorities is similar to paying interest on reserves to WPCs since it allows banks to
take greater risks with their liquidity and asset positions at no cost to themselves. The
tab is picked up by the authorities, which then either fund the expenditure through
taxes, or by creating more central bank money. In a 100% reserve system there is no
liquidity or solvency risk for the authorities. They can therefore afford to pay interest
on the reserves, and this will not be inflationary as long as the expenditure is funded
through taxation not emission.  
As PCEs do not have the investment trusts which the Simons-type system
      These are effectively "closed end" mutual funds. This is what has happened in9
Czechoslovakia in response to the opportunities created by the voucher mass privatization
scheme. "Open end" mutual funds on the other hand require a law of trusts and a highly
liquid stock market. As such they are likely to be unsuitable for PCEs in the early stages of
their transformation. 
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requires, the conditions which make it possible for such trusts to emerge need to be
created. However, the legal infrastructure for such trusts is much simpler than that
required by western-type banks. Ordinary company law should be sufficient, as
investment trusts can be ordinary companies which issue their own shares and which
then use the financial assets they accumulate in this way to buy the shares of other
existing companies or to create new companies . It is often pointed out that even in9
a mature capitalist country relatively few households own shares: people will first
wish to hold property they can directly control, then nominally denominated bank
deposits and only last financial assets whose nominal value is volatile. Given the lack
of track record of financial institutions in PCEs, this unwillingness to buy the shares
of investment trusts would be understandable. As a result, one can expect investment
trusts to develop slowly in PCEs. However, a similar unwillingness to deposit one's
money in banks would probably exist, were it not for the assumption of a
government guarantee of deposits. In the absence of such an implicit guarantee
people would have to chose between depositing their money in WPCs (which would
not pay interest and might charge for the services they provided), holding cash,
buying nominally denominated commercial paper and buying shares in investment
trusts. Under such circumstances the relative attractiveness of investment trusts might
be somewhat greater than at present, particularly if WPCs were not subsidized by the
state.
The fact that as a result of the slowness of the development of investment
      Thus in Poland, for example, SOEs have been unwilling to issue securitized debt,10
as the failure to repay it when due makes them automatically subject to bankruptcy
proceedings, whereas the accumulation of inter-enterprise arrears does not [Rostowski 1993].
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trusts, a large part of the nation's personal savings would lie "useless" at the
monobank need not be feared. First, it is better for these savings to lie "useless" than
for them to be wasted as a result of incompetent lending by commercial banks.
Second, the savings can be exported and invested abroad via foreign investment
funds. Third, savings can also be mobilized by the issuing of securitized debt and
equity (commercial paper and shares). Initially the demand for such instruments may
be relatively small, but the total unavailability under a Simons-type financial system
of bank credit, which by definition is "soft" under PCE conditions - particularly as
regards state owned enterprises (SOEs) - might change SOEs attitude to privatization
(which would become one of the few ways of obtaining outside financing) and to the
issuing of securitized debt . 10
Finally, if it is not the aim to develop a western style banking system, but
rather to move towards a Simons-type financial system, then the various proposals
for a write-off of SOE debt [Begg and Portes 1992, Schmieding 1991, Williamson 1992]
make sense. Writing off the debts of SOEs entails recapitalization of the banks by the
state. Once a fractional reserve two tier banking system exists - however immature
it may be - commercial bank managements need to be largely independent of the
state as regards their credit decisions. Recapitalization therefore means that the state
effectively allows two independent sets of agents (the managements of the banks and
the SOEs) to determine its expenditures. Under such circumstances, once the
precedent of a supposedly "one-off" debt forgiveness has been set, the belief that it
will be repeated (again and again) may become strong. The costs of proving that the
      This is why debt write-off made much more sense for the ex-GDR and Czecho-11
Slovakia in 1990 than it did for market socialist economies such as Hungary and Poland.
      Thus all subsidies to SOEs become transparent, and the central bank covers the12
budget deficit openly by creating money to extend credit to government, rather than hiding
it by extending unrepayable credit to banks or SOEs. Stabilization is then effected by making
central bank lending to government illegal.
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initial debt write-off is not a precedent could be very high.
In the absence of a two tier banking system, and in the absence of any
intention of creating one, debt forgiveness becomes a simple matter. SOEs have their
debts to the monobank written off and replaced by government debt on the asset side
of the monobank's balance sheet. Since the SOEs and the monobank all belong to the
state this is a pure book-keeping operation without any economic significance, as long
as the SOEs did not have a large degree of operational and financial autonomy at the
time they incurred their debts (i.e. as long as we are still in the highly centrally
planned phase of a PCE in transition) . Once the debt has been written off, the11
monobank is banned from any further lending to non-government . The one-off12
nature of a debt forgiveness carried out in this way would be fairly credible.
If the PCE has reached the transitional stage in banking system evolution,
evolution towards a Simons-type financial system could take place as follows: first,
banks could be split into WPC and investment trust operations; second, WPCs would
be required to increase their reserves over time until they had achieved 100%
backing. At the same time they would transfer non-reserve assets to the investment
trust parts of the old commercial banks. Depositors would be required to choose
whether their money was to remain on deposit in WPCs, which charged for their
services, or to be transformed into shares in the investment trust companies issuing
from the original commercial bank. If such a financial system was combined with a
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currency board one would have a highly stable monetary system.
CHOOSING AN APPROPRIATE MONETARY RULE
1. The case for a Monetary Rule
Ever since the writings of the currency school in England in the 1840s
economists have been aware that the broad money supply tends to vary in a pro-
cyclical way, either causing or at the least increasing the amplitude of the business
cycle [Schwartz, 1989]. However, attempts by central bank authorities to counter this
tendency through discretionary policy intervention are often mistimed, and result
only in its exacerbation. Hence the belief that a rule should be established for the
behaviour of the monetary base (or central bank money). These rules assumed the
gold standard (i.e. a fixed permanently exchange rate) and suggested a relationship
between domestic central bank money and either the level of, or changes in, the
international reserves (in gold) of the central bank [e.g.Simons, 1936]. PCEs seem to
be particularly in need of a monetary rule of this sort to provide a nominal anchor
for their monetary systems for two reasons: first, their central banks have little
experience in conducting monetary policy in an open economy with a convertible
currency, because monetary policy was previously subordinate to physical planning,
the economy was closed and/or the currency was not convertible. Second, the
transition is the "macroeconomic regime change" par excellence, making the conduct
of policy on the basis of behaviourial models of the economy impossible. As a result
policy has to consist in choosing values for those parameters which one can
determine (inevitably fairly arbitrarily), and establishing rules which ensure that the
economy adjusts to these parameters - hopefully as quickly and painlessly as
      To make things more difficult the domestic inflation rate then needs to be negative13
for a certain period as prices fall.
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possible. Third, many PCEs enter the transformation in a state of very high inflation.
Successful stabilization of very high inflation usually involves fixing the
exchange rate of the domestic currency, at least for a short period of time. This is
because very high inflation causes people to save on real balances - on which they
have to pay the inflation tax. Fixing the exchange rate means that for at least a short
period of time people know that the foreign exchange value of the domestic currency
will be stable. This can cause the demand for the domestic money to increase sharply,
so that a virtuous circle develops: increased demand for domestic money ends the
"flight from domestic money" which is fuelling very high inflation - as inflation falls
the demand for money increases further - and so on [Dornbusch and Simonsen, 1988].
A key problem is how to maintain credibility for the new fixed exchange rate
without starving the economy of the greatly increased real money balances now
desired. If the authorities fail to accommodate this increased demand for money by
increased supply, then in the absence of perfect capital mobility, they will cause very
high real interest rates to prevail. These can only be avoided if prices fall to such an
extent that the given nominal money supply satisfies the demand for real balances
at the new low rate of inflation . If on the other hand, the authorities increase the13
supply of money rapidly the danger is that they will undermine the credibility of the
stabilization. Caught on the horns of this dilemma the authorities usually try to steer
a middle course, which causes an information and control problem. It is impossible
to know whether high interest rates mainly reflect liquidity shortage (in which case
19
the nominal money supply should be increased), or the lack of credibility of the
exchange rate (in which case the nominal money supply should be tightly controlled).
A solution to this problem would be the adoption of a monetary rule strictly
relating the supply of the monetary base to international reserves. However, the kind
of monetary rule suitable for a given PCE largely depends on the extent to which its
banking system has evolved  from the classical Soviet-type monobank towards a fully
fledged two tier Western-type system, since this determines the relationship between
the monetary base and the broad money supply. We address this question in the
Sections 7 to 10.
2. The reserve accumulation problem
However, the first problem facing a PCE wishing to base monetary system on
a monetary rule is how to accumulate adequate reserves to back the currency fully.
The exchange rate needed may result initially in a very undervalued currency. In an
economy, such as that of most PCEs, in which the currency has for a long time been
inconvertible and where prices have been state administered, finding the right level
at which to fix the exchange rate is particularly hard. The fact that most prices have
been fixed by the state means that a degree of "corrective inflation" resulting from the
adjustment of prices to market clearing levels and the elimination of the monetary
overhang is unavoidable. Yet the degree of corrective inflation will itself depend on
the exchange rate, as the domestic prices of traded goods will depend on world
prices and the exchange rate. The high degree of initial undervaluation which is likely
to be necessary to ensure a high level of backing of the money supply may lead to
      The problem resulting from the need for  reserve accumulation does not stem14
mainly from the size of the required payments surplus. Thus during the Polish stabilization
program, by the time international reserves and the real value of the money supply ceased
growing in October 1990, cash was 160% backed and cash and foreign currency deposits
together were 70% backed. Although Poland did not start its stabilization programme with
zero reserves, this was achieved by Poland running a trade surplus equivalent to only some
2.7% of GDP during 1990, which gives an indication that the trade surplus which might be
needed by a PCE to back its currency need not be very large.
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high inflation and recession during the period of reserve accumulation [Rostowski
1992] .14
It is, of course, possible to follow different monetary rules, to establish for
example a "fractional monetary rule" or a "marginal monetary rule". In the first the
targeted money aggregate (e.g. domestic currency or broad money) would be only
fractionally backed by foreign currency (say 50%), while in the second, only increases
in domestic currency would be backed, but these would be 100% backed. The
advantage of both systems over 100% backing is that a far smaller amount of foreign
currency has to be obtained by the country, so that a smaller balance of payments
surplus needs to be generated. The disadvantage of both systems is that confidence
in the domestic currency and the fixed exchange rate would be proportionally
smaller. For a fractional monetary rule to be credible, the fractionality of the backing
has to be maintained also during periods of contraction of international reserves. In
order to avoid the risk of abrogation of international convertibility of the national
currency, one could have a monetary rule which was marginal during periods of
international reserve expansion, while during periods of international reserve
contraction it would follow a fractional backing rule. The proposal put forward in
Rostowski [1992] for a currency board for a parallel currency for Latvia has many of
the advantages of the "marginal currency board" while avoiding its disadvantages.
      This is not the trivial point it may appear at first sight. In Russia at the time of15
writing there is a severe cash shortage, resulting from loose credit policy in a
hyperinflationary environment, combined with the inability of the printing presses to keep up
with the demand for cash. The result is the maintenance by the Central Bank of Russia of the
inconvertibility of business deposits into cash for most purposes (exceptions being such uses
as the payment of wages). 
      Simons [1936] suggested such an approach for the US (the backing would, of16
course, have been in gold).
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3. The Monetary Rule for a Monobank
All money in such a system is central bank money, and it can take one of three
forms: 100% backed deposits at a specialised bank, deposits at the state bank itself,
or cash (also a central bank liability). If there existed an economy with a monobank
system and a convertible currency then the monobank could quite easily adopt a
monetary rule: it would manage its deposit liabilities so as to ensure their
convertibility on demand into domestic currency  and also so as to ensure that all15
domestic currency was fully, fractionally or marginally backed (whichever approach
had been adopted - see next section). An alternative would be for the monobank to
adopt some rule for the fractional backing of all money  (deposits as well as16
currency), or for the backing of increases in money, with international reserves. The
banking system in Czecho-Slovakia was not dissimilar to such a "monobank with
convertibility" at the beginning of the economic reform in that country in early 1991,
with one foreign trade bank, one savings bank, one investment bank and one
commercial bank in each of the two constituent republics of the Federation.
A key question facing policy makers in such a situation is how to combine
maintenance of the monetary rule with the evolution of the banking system towards
a two tier competitive system of the western kind? On the other hand if the ultimate
aim is the creation of a Simons-type financial system, then the traditional Soviet-type
      100% international reserve backing of the monetary base, would imply the export17
of a large proportion of domestic savings, which would be likely to be criticised (see Section
4 for a discussion of this question). 
      Also Hanke, Jonung and Schuler [1992].18
      With or without obligatory minimum reserve requirements. Hanke and Schuler19
assume that liquid reserves are set voluntarily by banks.
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monobank provides an excellent starting point. The main problem facing the
authorities, apart from the development of WPCs described in Section 4, would be
obtaining sufficient reserves to back the central bank money in the system . 17
4. The case against a Currency Board in a PCE with a Transitional Banking
System
Hanke and Schuler [1991] have proposed such a system as the solution to
Yugoslavia's chronic high inflation problems . In a currency board system all18
domestic currency has to have a fixed amount (over 100%) of backing in foreign
currency denominated assets or foreign cash. The Board always stands ready to
exchange domestic currency into the foreign currency to which the domestic currency
is fixed (henceforth called the "metropolitan currency"). A pure Humean mechanism
then ensures that in the medium term prices cannot change but as in the
"metropolitan country". In the short term, if prices of traded goods are lower than in
the metropolitan country, the reserves of the Currency Board will increase, increasing
domestic cash and therefore - through the standard money multiplier  - the domestic19
money supply and thus the prices of traded goods. If the process goes too far and
prices of traded goods exceed those in the metropolitan country, the mechanism goes
      The simplicity of the mechanism might be largely lost if there were a significant20
inflow of short-term capital (as has happened in 1991-2 in Argentina). This, however, is
unlikely initially in the case of most PCEs because of a lack of credibility of the new
monetary regime, particularly to foreigners. 
      And lower than if foreign currency itself were actually used as money within the21
country.
      In British colonies which had currency boards most banks were branches of United22
Kingdom banks and thus had access to the Bank of England as lender of last resort via their
headquarters.
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into reverse, causing the domestic money supply to decline, so that prices fall . The20
fact that only a fraction of the backing is held in foreign cash, while the rest is held
in foreign interest bearing assets, means that the costs, in terms of seigniorage paid
to the metropolitan country are significantly lower than they would be otherwise .21
The low level of banking skills during the transitional period in PCEs makes
the implementation of a classical currency board system in its unadulterated form,
as proposed by Hanke and Schuler, quite unsuitable. For a PCE to move directly to
a currency board means that the monetary system is switched from being one in
which the central bank is lender of first resort to one in which there is no lender of
last resort whatever . In the Hanke and Schuler approach, only the cash part of the22
domestic money supply is backed, and banks are entirely free to  decide on their own
reserve ratios - i.e. it is entirely up to them to decide to what extent they will back
their deposit liabilities with domestic currency (which itself is to be 100% backed by
foreign currency) and to what extent they will back deposits with the credits which
they extend to borrowers.
As a result, irresponsible credit expansion by the banks on an excessively small
reserve (cash) base could lead to a run on bank deposits, once it was realised how
small the cash reserves of the banking system are. Since a currency board cannot be
      Under a "marginal fractional broad money rule" total domestic money is allowed23
to grow as some multiple of the increase in international reserves (let us say 2). The
disadvantage of this system, as stated in the previous section, is that if the country started off
with almost no international reserves and if, after a period of increasing reserves and money
there comes a period of loss of reserves due to some external shock, then the money supply
needs to be reduced more sharply for a given fall in international reserves than it was allowed
to expand while international reserves were increasing, for the maintenance of convertibility
at the fixed parity is to be ensured (i.e. if the country is not to run out of reserves). 
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a lender of last resort to the banking system, the board would then be faced with the
choice of supplying unbacked currency to the banks (i.e. suspending the currency
board system), or of allowing the collapse of many banks (and possibly of the
banking system as a whole). This is always the problem with a currency board, and
indeed it is the key to the discipline it exerts on the banks. However, the danger is
magnified when a currency board is grafted onto a banking system with practically
no liquidity management skills. The consequence of incompetence on the asset side
could be even more dangerous, leading to not just the ill-liquidity but the actual
insolvency of the bulk of the banking system (see Sections 2 and 3). 
5. A "Broad Money" Rule for PCEs with a Transitional Banking System
In PCEs with a transitional banking system of the type described in Section 1,
what I call a "broad money rule" may be more suitable than a classical currency
board. This consists in the central bank committing itself to maintain some given level
of backing of the whole broad money stock. Under a "fractional broad money rule"
the exchange rate is set so as to generate international reserves which will give a
desired level of backing, after which the money supply is allowed to expand, at the
margin, at the rate allowing the maintenance of that ratio . Under a "full" broad23
money rule, 100% of the domestic money supply is backed by foreign assets. This is
      Had the nominal money supply not been allowed to grow after this period, Poland24
would have saved herself a further 60% inflation during 1991.
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the system which obtained in the second half of 1992 in Estonia.
If the relationship between broad money and central bank money depends on
an obligatory reserve ratio (augmented by a capital/asset ratio), then the central bank
needs to maintain a relationship between central bank money and international
reserves such that the relationship between international reserves and broad money
to which the central bank is committed is indeed adhered to. So that if the degree of
backing of central bank money with foreign assets was more than 100%, then the
degree of backing of broad money with foreign assets would be higher than the
obligatory reserve ratio. In less sophisticated systems, changes in deposit money can
be controlled via changes in credit limits which are themselves dependant on changes
in international reserves. 
The achievement of high levels of backing for the domestic money supply need
not necessarily involve the generation of huge payments surpluses, particularly in
countries which have suffered from very high inflation. Thus in the case of Poland
total broad money (zloty cash and deposits and hard currency deposits) was almost
40% backed by international reserves when it reached its maximum in 1990. This was
achieved by Poland running a trade surplus equivalent to some 2.7% of GDP during
the year .   24
Furthermore, as described in Section 9, an arrangement by which a large part
of a country's money supply is backed by foreign assets need not mean that the
country must pay a large amount of seigniorage to the foreign government whose
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currency backs the domestic money supply. This is because a significant part of the
backing can be held in the form of secure interest bearing assets (e.g. government
bonds) of the metropolitan country, so that the backing is not bought from the
metropolitan country (seigniorage), but merely constitutes a loan to it. If deposits as
well as cash were backed by foreign assets, the assets concerned could be allowed to
be less liquid than in the case when they were backing only cash. 
An arrangement of this kind does, of course, imply the export of a significant
part of a country's household and enterprise savings, as we noted in Section 4. The
proportion will depend on the share of savings which actors wish to hold in money
form, and the proportion to which broad money is backed. For this reason the "broad
money rule" monetary system is likely to be criticized by those pointing to the great
shortage of capital in PCEs, which need to restructure their economies profoundly
after decades of misallocation of investment by central planners. However, against
this must be set the fact that the original problem which needs to be solved is that
the newly liberalized banking system is also incapable of allocating credit efficiently.
Savings allocated within the country via the banking system are therefore also likely
to be wasted. By reducing the share of deposit money backed by domestic credits,
and increasing the share backed by foreign assets, a monetary system based on
"broad money rule" reduces the amount of waste involved. Until credit allocation
skills have been developed in the banking system it is therefore better for an
important part of savings deposited in banks to be invested abroad, ensuring in this
way at least the stability of the monetary system (and the avoidance of the loss of the
domestic savings).
In this initial period domestic investment would be financed mainly by equity
      With both unlimited and limited liability. Public companies with widespread share25
ownership are unlikely to develop on a large scale initially, because of a lack of track record.
      A strict currency board would not accept commercial bank deposits.26
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participation (i.e. in most cases by ploughback of profits and the establishment of
partnerships ). If the aim is to develop a western style banking system then the key25
policy question is at what rate and how to liberalize the tight regulations described
above, so that the banks' role in the allocation of savings within the country can grow
safely.
Finally, it is worth noting that the difference between a 100% broad money
rule and a financial system of the type proposed by Simons is not large. Although
nominally denominated assets exist in the former on a large scale and do not in the
latter, they are mostly held against foreigners and therefore do not constitute
liabilities of domestic economic actors. Fractional broad money rules would be closer
to 100% reserve banking, the closer the amount of foreign backing of broad money
was to 100%.
6. The Argentine-type "High-powered Money Rule"
This is the case where the provision of central bank reserve money to banks
is made dependant on the balance of payments position of the country, each dollar
of international reserve accumulation generating a given number of dollars of reserve
money. If one dollar of reserve money was made available to the banking system for
each dollar of international reserves accumulated, one would have something very
close to a currency board mechanism, except that not only cash but also commercial
bank reserves at the central bank would be backed by foreign assets . If the system26
      As such a pseudo-currency board of this kind would have less credibility than a27
fully fledged board. In Argentina the law would need to be changed for the high powered
money rule to be abandoned. Since this would take time, enabling massive capital flight,
Argentina seems to be very pre-committed to the rule. 
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were run by a central bank then it could, without any institutional or legal measures
change the rule it was following . If more than one dollar of reserve money was27
made available to the banking system for each dollar of international reserves, then
one would have a "fractional" or "marginal" high-powered money board arrangement.
In either of these cases the interest rate on central bank loans to commercial banks
would be determined exclusively by the need to achieve the pre-announced
relationship between reserve money and international reserves (or between the
increments in each of these). High reserve and capital/asset ratios would be required
to ensure the safety of deposits. In Argentina the reserve requirement on foreign
currency deposits is 3%, giving a money multiplier of 33. With a fixed dollar/new
peso parity of one to one and full convertibility of the peso, the dangers implicit in
this arrangement are clear. Indeed, the real appreciation of the peso has recently been
so large as to cast serious doubts on the sustainability of the system. This kind of
monetary rule would clearly only be suitable for a PCE in which the banking system
and banking skills had reached an almost western level of development, for example
Hungary.
      Simons was writing in 1936. Readers of this paper in 1995 may have a perspective28
which is closer to Simons' than the one I am able to adopt at today.
      Even when, as in Poland, the bad loans were largely "liquidated" by the29
hyperinflation of 1989, the banks reproduced these bad loans during the high real interest rate
stabilization period of 1990-2.
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CONCLUSIONS
The stability of the Western banking system since the war still allows one to
accept it as the basic model towards which PCE financial systems will probably
ultimately evolve . Nevertheless, the experience of PCEs since 1990 and the28
experience of fragile banking systems subjected to high degrees of political
interference in Latin American and African countries, suggests that haste should be
made very slowly. In other words, we should be well advised to incorporate
significant elements of the Simons-type into the financial system of PCEs. The
approach to banking system reform which has become pretty well universal in PCEs,
and which consists in creating, usually out of bits of the old monobank, autonomous
state owned commercial banks which are supposed to be guided by the profit motive,
and which are intended to be ultimately privatized, seems fraught with danger. These
state commercial banks (SCBs) not only lack private owners, and therefore the
motivation to be truly profit maximizing, they also lack basic banking skills, and are
often burdened with the old monobank's bad loans . Being state owned there is an29
implicit state guarantee not only for their deposits but also for their capital (SCB
losses are part of the quasi budget deficit even if there is no formal write-down of
loans or recapitalization). Most important, once the possibilities of extracting money
from the state budget have been exhausted, the PCE banking system is often seen as
      The hundreds of billions of rubles of credit made available to SOEs in Russia in30
1992 are a good example, as are the subsidized credits for agriculture granted throughout
Central and Eastern Europe.
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a source of "directed" soft financing by various populist and lobby groups .30
A number of conclusions follow. If the PCE concerned is lucky enough to still
have its monobank intact, it should not try to create the standard two tier Western-
style banking system by hiving-off SCBs. Rather it should create competitive WPCs,
either by splitting the monobank (the provision of warehousing and payments
services should not be beyond the ability of the market socialist enterprises which
will be created in this way) or, better, by allowing private WPCs to be formed and
for these to create their own clearing and settlement centres if they wish. Initially no
domestic banks would be allowed. Savings would be mobilized either through equity
participation - ploughback, share floatation, investment trusts, foreign direct
investment - or through non-intermediated debt (i.e. commercial paper). 
Domestic banks would only be allowed to begin operations slowly. They
would be obliged to operate subject to very high reserve and capital/asset ratios
(from 25% up). Since there would be no lender of last resort in the system, reserves
could be drawn down to meet liquidity needs, but such a move would render the
bank concerned subject to a tightening of supervision by the bank supervisory
authority. It would also be made very clear from the start that deposits at banks
(unlike those at WPCs) were in no way guaranteed by the state. If a third tier of non-
banks outside the authorities' supervisory system came into existence, the fact that
the companies concerned had no legal right to take deposits (but were merely
borrowing under the ordinary commercial laws with a promise to repay on demand),
should be enough for it to be clear to depositors what risks were involved.
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Foreign banks of good repute setting up branches in the PCE, and subject to
the supervision of their own central bank, would also be allowed to operate with
minimal local supervision, as long as the capital of the of the whole bank was legally
subject to make good the losses of its local branches. Since they would not be
required to satisfy the stringent conditions facing native banks, foreign banks would
have a considerable competitive advantage. There is no doubt that the banking
system might be taken over by foreign banks. But given the argument that a secure
banking system is vital for macroeconomic stability, and that macroeconomic stability
is vital for a successful transition to a market economy, then some PCEs may find it
most efficient to import foreign banks to create their banking systems, just as they
have to import foreign machinery for their productive investments. The law of
comparative advantage does not apply only to goods.
In the final stage of banking system evolution in a PCE, reserve and
capital/asset requirements for domestic banks could be slowly reduced towards
western levels, as the bank supervisory authority became more confident of its own
supervisory skills and of the banking skills of the commercial banks. However, as
long as a monetary rule was in force, i.e. as long as there was no lender of last resort,
these ratios would need to be higher than in systems with a central bank. A strategic
decision would then be needed with regard to the WPCs. Allowing them to reduce
their reserve ratios, i.e. to become banks, would mean accepting the transformation
of the system into one based entirely on classical western two tier banking system
lines. 
Because the banking system is a major weak point of monetary control in PCEs
it is important that any monetary rule which is adopted should embrace a broad
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money aggregate, as long as the structure and skills of the banking system are such
as to render very risky indirect control of the whole money stock through control of
currency or high powered money alone. As the skills of the banks improve the
monetary rule can be changed from a "broad money rule", first to a "high powered
money rule" and finally to a currency board.
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